UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 22
Issue 3 Journal of Computer & Information Law
- Spring 2004

Article 2

Spring 2004

Dow Jones and the Defamatory Defendant Down Under: A
Comparison of Australian and American Approaches to Libelous
Language in Cyberspace, 22 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.
553 (2004)
Richard L. Creech

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Creech, Dow Jones and the Defamatory Defendant Down Under: A Comparison of Australian and
American Approaches to Libelous Language in Cyberspace, 22 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 553
(2004)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol22/iss3/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator
of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

DOW JONES AND THE DEFAMATORY
DEFENDANT DOWN UNDER:
A COMPARISON OF AUSTRALIAN

AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
TO LIBELOUS LANGUAGE
IN CYBERSPACE
RICHARD L.

CREECHt

Among the numerous dramatic phenomena wrought by the advent
of the Internet is the marked increase in communication across political
borders. Cyberspace, of course, is not easily constrained by national
boundaries, and material posted on the World Wide Web in one jurisdiction can easily be accessed, as the medium's name indicates, by readers
around the globe, raising the question of where suits arising from such
communications should be adjudicated and whose substantive law
should govern them. Australia's highest court recently grappled with
this issue and concluded that an American publisher which allegedly defamed an Australian businessman when it uploaded statements onto the
Web from its server in the United States could be subject to suit in the
Australian state where that businessman lived. This opinion, the first of
its kind from a national court of last resort, is at odds with the views
adopted by some American courts which have recently considered similar cases. The explanation for the discrepancy between the Australian
and American approaches is to be found through an examination of the
different views that their respective societies take of the nature of communication and the relative value of the interests of the parties involved.
Differences between Australia and the United States regarding the
juridical analysis of language are particularly noteworthy because the
two countries share significant linguistic and legal features. English is
t Richard L. Creech is an attorney who studies the interaction of law and language.
He has a bachelor's degree in linguistics from Harvard University, a juris doctorate degree
from the Northwestern University School of Law, and an LLM in international and European law from the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands. He has practiced law in both
Chicago and Washington, DC, and invites readers who share his legal and linguistic interests to contact him at rcreech@hotmail.com.
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the dominant language in both countries (setting the occurrence of some
quaint Aussie-isms aside), and the two countries are both constitutional
democracies with common-law legal systems inherited from England.
Furthermore, both countries have federal arrangements in which political and judicial power is shared, sometimes uneasily, between a superior
national government and numerous constituent states, each of which has
its own unique set of laws and courts. Within each country, as a result,
separate legal systems are often in conflict with one another, and judges
are well accustomed to disputes as to which entity's law is to be applied
to lawsuits that have connections to more than one jurisdiction.
While the English concept of defamation has been formulated somewhat differently in the various jurisdictions which have been based on
Anglo-Saxon legal norms, in general one may say that person X defames
person Y when X makes, or "publishes," to use the legal term of art, a
false statement about Y to a third person, and Y's reputation is damaged
as a result.' The tripartite relationship among the author, reader and
subject person of a libelous communication may be conceptualized as
follows:

Each party has a relationship with the other two. An author writes
about a subject (that is to say, he allegedly defames him) and makes a
statement to a reader. The reader receives the statement from the author and that statement, if it is indeed defamatory, will have a negative
influence on the reader's opinion of the subject. The subject is not a
party to the communication as such, but he nonetheless has a relationship with both parties; he is the subject of the author's comments and he
1. See Black's Law Dictionary 417 (6th ed., West 1990).
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has a reputation that may be damaged in the mind of the reader. The
schism between the Australian and American understandings of defamation is rooted in a difference as to which party to a communication is paid
more attention, with American courts focusing on the author of the statement, and Australian courts on the recipient. This divergence, I will argue, reflects some basic differences in the legal and societal values of the
two countries.
I.

THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT'S DOW JONES DECISION

The location of the reader, which is where the subject's reputation
may be said to be located as well, was of paramount concern to the High
Court of Australia when it decided Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick in December 2002.2 This case pitted Joseph Gutnick, who is a Melbourne
mining magnate, against Dow Jones, the American publisher of the Wall
Street Journal and Barron'smagazine. Gutnick claimed that Dow Jones
defamed him in an article which it posted on a subscription-based Web
site that accused him of "money laundering" and other financial improprieties.3 The Web site was accessed by subscribers from all over the
world, including at least several hundred in the state of Victoria, where
Gutnick lived and where he claimed his business activities and reputation were centered. 4 After Gutnick filed suit against Dow Jones in the
Supreme Court of Victoria, Dow Jones moved to dismiss the action, arguing that Victoria lacked jurisdiction, was an inappropriate forum, and
was not the jurisdiction whose law should govern the case. 5 The trial
judge ruled against Dow Jones on each point, 6 and Dow Jones was
granted special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, where it
was joined by several media companies which intervened to support its
position.
The High Court stated that the principal issue in the case, which
was relevant to all three challenges mounted by Dow Jones, was where
the allegedly defamatory statement had been "published."7 This inquiry
stemmed from the fact that the law to be applied to the case was the law
where the tort was committed - the lex loci delicti. If it were deemed to
2. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56. This case was on appeal from
the decision of Judge Hedigan of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Gutnick v. Dow Jones &
Co., Inc., [2001] VSC 305.
3. Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., [2001] VSC 305 at 3.
4. Dow Jones admitted that several hundred subscribers were from Victoria and that
among them were "significant persons from finance, business and stockbroking," some of
whom might be presumed to have downloaded the article. The evidence also indicated that
there were 1,700 subscribers from Australia as a whole. [2001] VSC 305 at 912.
5. Id. at $1 6-8.
6. Id. at IT 127-31.
7. [2002] HCA 56 at 1 4 (opinion of Gleeson, CJ); id. at 9170 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
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have been committed in Victoria, Victorian law would govern the case
and there would accordingly be a basis for jurisdiction in Victoria and a
compelling reason to dismiss Dow Jones' inconvenient forum claim.
Gutnick claimed that the article was "published" in Victoria when it was
downloaded from the Web and read by readers in Victoria. The article
may have been published in other places as well (arguably everywhere in
the world where it was downloaded), but Gutnick was only concerned
about publication in Victoria, and was only seeking damages based on
the injury to his reputation in Victoria. 8 Dow Jones argued that it was
the law of New Jersey, not Victoria, that should apply to this case, as it
was in that state where Dow Jones maintained the server which had
uploaded the offending article onto the World Wide Web. 9
Determining the place of publication was of crucial importance, as
the law of defamation in Victoria is substantially different from that of
New Jersey. In both Australia and the United States, the law of defamation is controlled by state law, and within each country the law varies
from state to state in many, sometimes significant, ways. Putting domestic variation aside, however, even more pronounced differences are
evident when Australian defamation law is compared to American law.
Chief Justice Gleeson, in an opinion which was joined by three other justices, explained that
[Tihe law of defamation seeks to strike a balance between, on the one
hand, society's interest in freedom of speech and the free exchange of
information and ideas.., and, on the other hand, an individual's interest in maintaining his or her reputation in society free from unwarranted slur or damage. The way in which those interests are balanced
10
differs from society to society.
In Australia, the law views a person's reputation as the paramount
concern, and a defendant may be held liable for defamation "even though
no injury to reputation was intended and the defendant acted with reasonable care.""' By contrast, in the United States the promotion of free
speech, which is enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution, 12 is seen as a more important societal value. The U.S. Supreme
Court has accordingly held that in order to protect the First Amendment
8. As Justice Callinan stated, "[t]he fact that publication might occur everywhere
does not mean that it occurs nowhere." [2002] HCA 56 at 86 (opinion of Callinan, J.).
9. There was no relevant connection to New Jersey apart from the presence of the
server. Dow Jones was neither incorporated in nor maintained its principal offices in New
Jersey; Dow Jones is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware and has its main
offices in New York. In fact, Dow Jones at times suggested, but not without equivocation,
that New York law might be applied to the case. [2002] HCA 56 at 5 (opinion of Gleeson,

J.).
10. Id. at 23 (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.). See also id. at 91117 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
11. Id. at T125 (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.).
12. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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right to comment on matters affecting the public interest, a publisher
may not be held liable for defamation unless the plaintiff can establish
that he is somehow at fault in making a defamatory statement. 13 In
other words, a simple honest mistake will not result in liability. Instead,
a plaintiff must show that a publisher was at least negligent in its reporting, or, if the subject about whom he is writing is considered a "public figure," an even higher standard is applied - the plaintiff must show
that the publisher knew the statement was false, or demonstrated reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. 1 4 Because of this scienter requirement, the United States is typically viewed, relative to other
countries such as Australia, as being "defendant-friendly" in defamation
actions. 15
As harm to reputation is the gravamen of Australian defamation
law, the High Court in Dow Jones opined that the damage "is done when
a defamatory publication is comprehended by the reader, the listener, or
the observer." As a result, Chief Justice Gleeson explained:
[O]rdinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where the damage
to reputation occurs. Ordinarily that will be where the material which
is alleged to be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person defamed has in that place a reputation
which is thereby damaged. It is only when the material is in comprehensible form that the damage to reputation is done and it is damage to
reputation which is the principal focus of defamation, not any quality of
the defendant's conduct. In the case of material on the World Wide
Web, it is not available in comprehensible form until downloaded on to
the computer of a person who has used a web browser to pull the material from the web server. It is where that person downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be done. Ordinarily then, that
16
will be the place where the tort of defamation is committed.
The Court therefore dismissed Dow Jones' appeal and allowed the case to
17
proceed to trial in Victoria.
13. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
14. Id.; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Several cases have examined what it means to be a "public figure" for purposes of defamation law. See e.g. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976).
15. There are other ways in which the U.S. is seen to favor the rights of defamation
defendants over plaintiffs. For example, as noted by the court of first instance in the
Gutnick case, under American defamation law a plaintiff must prove that a statement was
false, while in Australia, a defamatory statement is presumed to be false, and the defendant has the burden of proving otherwise [2001] VSC 305 $ 127.
16. [2002] HCA 56 at 44 (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.). See also id. at 84 (opinion of
Kirby, J.).
17. An interesting postscript to this case is that the reporter who wrote the article at
issue took the highly unusual, if not unprecedented, step of challenging the High Court's
ruling by filing a petition with the United Nations' Human Rights Commission in which he
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Dow Jones' argument that New Jersey should be deemed the place
of publication, to the exclusion of all other places, was driven heavily by
the so-called "single publication rule," which is a peculiar rule of American defamation jurisprudence which arose to deal with widely disseminated publications such as books and newspapers, and later radio and
television broadcasts. Conceptually, and originally under common law,
one could say that if one thousand copies of a defamatory article were
made and distributed to one thousand different people, there have been
one thousand different publications, and a plaintiff would have one thousand different claims against the defendant.' 8 This could make the litigation of defamation claims rather complicated, however, particularly
when publication had occurred in multiple jurisdictions. To simplify
matters, American courts developed the single publication rule, which
provides that any single edition of a book, newspaper, or so forth, is
deemed to constitute a "single publication," and a plaintiff is allowed
only one action to recover damages for that publication. 1 9 In that single
action, however, he may recover all damages suffered in all jurisdictions. 20 The single publication rule is followed in at least 27 U.S. states,
including New Jersey, 21 and it has recently been held applicable to de22
famatory publications on the Internet.
The single publication rule does not provide that any particular jurisdiction is the place where the single action must be heard, but does
nonetheless reinforce the notion that publication is the result of a singular action on the part of the publisher. On the basis of this rule, Dow
Jones argued that what was determinative in this case was its own act of
placing the article on a server in New Jersey, which constituted a single
act of publication, and not the reading of the article in multiple jurisdictions around the world. Under the single publication rule Gutnick could
only bring one action against Dow Jones to recover all damages for injury
to his reputation and, Dow Jones contended, Victoria was an inappropriate place to litigate all such claims, especially when, in its view, it was
the law of New Jersey which was to apply to the case.
has alleged that the Court's ruling constitutes a breach of Australia's obligation to protect
free speech under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
See Sydney Morning Herald, AustralianLaws Challenged at U.N., <http://www.smh.com.
aularticles/2003/04/18/1050172745955.html> (Apr. 18, 2003).
18. In the mid-nineteenth century, an English court upheld an action for libel on the
basis of the re-sale in 1847 of a single copy of a newspaper which had originally been
printed in 1830. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
19. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A(3)-(4) (1977).
20. Id. at § 577A(4)(b).
21. See generally Barnes v. Holt, Rinehart& Winston, Inc., 330 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. L.
Div. 1974), affd, 359 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976).
22. Mitan v. Davis, 243 F. Supp. 2d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Firth v. New York, 775
N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 2002).

2004]

DOW JONES & THE DEFAMATORY DEFENDANT

559

Gutnick was not seeking to recover for damage sustained outside of
Victoria, however, and undertook not to do so. 2 3 An even bigger problem
for Dow Jones, though, was the fact that the single publication rule is not
a legal doctrine followed in Australia. Instead, the publication of a defamatory statement in each Australian state or territory is deemed to
constitute a separately actionable wrong, a principle which stems from
Australia's concern with an individual's right to his reputation and his
interest in vindicating it wherever it is assailed. 24
Dow Jones argued strenuously that the High Court should reformulate Australian defamation law so as to incorporate the single publication rule, and to designate the location of the server as the place of single
publication, and contended that the advent of the Internet was a sufficiently revolutionary technological advancement so as to warrant a dramatic re-adjustment of the law. Dow Jones argued that the Web had
resulted in an information explosion that transcended national boundaries and reached into every country in the world, and that publishers on
the Web needed to have certainty as to which law governed their use of
the Web, lest they be forced to consider the laws of every country from
Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and then comply with the most restrictive defamation laws that could apply. This would have the effect of chilling
speech on the Internet, Dow Jones maintained, and such an undesirable
result could be avoided by establishing a hard and fast rule that deemed
the place of uploading to be the place of publication and the place whose
law would govern defamation disputes. Moreover, Dow Jones contended
that American law was appropriately applicable to this case, as the article was written "in America for Americans" concerned about the American financial markets, and accordingly had "an indelibly American
'2 5
complexion.
The Court found numerous problems with this submission. As Justice Kirby stated, "[wihere a person or corporation publishes material
which is potentially defamatory to another, to ask the publisher to be
cognisant of the defamation laws of the place where the person resides
and has a reputation is not to impose on the publisher an excessive burden."2 6 Justice Callinan was even more blunt, noting that "[plublishers
23. [2002] HCA 56 at 6 (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.).
24. See e.g. Australian Broad. Corp. v. Waterhouse, [1991] 25 NSWLR 519. In that
case, the court explained that several other legal mechanisms in Australia provided protection against an unwieldy number of cases arising from multiple publications. These consisted of rules providing for relief against abuse of process, the aggregation of damages, the
consolidation of proceedings, and the application of statutory provisions against double
compensation. This observation was cited by Justice Kirby in Dow Jones, who also added
the principle of estoppel to the list. [2002] HCA 56 at 127 n. 155 (opinion of Gaudron, J.).
25. [2001] VSC 305 at 20.
26. [2002] HCA 56 at 151 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
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are not obliged to publish on the Internet," and pointing out that "[i]f the
potential reach [of jurisdiction] is uncontrollable then the greater the
27
need to exercise care in publication."
Interestingly, the U.S. District Court in New Jersey ruled, two years
before the Dow Jones case, that it was unreasonable to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in New Jersey merely because the defendant's Web
server was located in that state. 28 While this ruling was not delivered in
the context of a defamation case (rather it involved claims of trademark
infringement), the opinion would have provided precedent for Dow Jones
to resist jurisdiction in New Jersey, had it been so inclined (and had it
not undertaken to submit to it in the current proceedings). 29 This decision, which the Australian High Court did not appear to be aware of,
reveals that courts on both sides of the Pacific view the location of a
server to be a rather flimsy basis for asserting jurisdiction.
And rightly so. As Justice Kirby noted in Dow Jones, "the place of
uploading of materials onto the Internet might bear little or no relationship to the place where the communication was composed, edited, or had
its major impact."30 The Court also expressed concern that if the location of a server determined the law to be applied in a case "[plublishers
would be free to manipulate the uploading and location of data so as to
insulate themselves from liability in Australia or elsewhere, for example,
by using a Web server in a 'defamation free jurisdiction' or one in which
the defamation laws are tilted decidedly towards defendants." 3 1 Indeed,
as discussed above, the United States is viewed as such a place, and the
Court was concerned that in light of the fact that a "vastly disproportionate" share of all of the Web servers in the world are in the United States,
a rule focusing on the location of the Web server would greatly extend
the reach of American law. 32 Justice Callinan went so far as to decry
Dow Jones' attempt to impose "an American legal hegemony" where the
consequence:
would be to confer upon one country, and one notably more benevolent
to the commercial and other media than [Australia is], an effective domain over the law of defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, and the serious disadvantage of those
unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the United
33
States.
27. Id. at 1 182 (opinion of Callinan, J.).
28. Amberson Holdings LLC v. Westside Story Newsp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J.
2000).
29. [2002] HCA 56 at 176 (opinion of Callinan, J.).
30. Id. at 130 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
31. Id. at $ 199 (opinion of Callinan, J.) (internal punctuation modified).
32. Id. at 133 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
33. Id. at 200 (opinion of Callinan, J.). Justice Callinan's concerns about the overextension of American power were echoed by members of Australia's legislature who heck-
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The Court was unmoved by the assertion that a new rule of defamation was justified by the advent of the Internet. While recognizing that
"the Internet does indeed present many novel technological features,"
the Court stressed that "it also shares many characteristics with earlier
technologies that have rapidly expanded the speed and quantity of information throughout the world." 3 4 Moreover, the Court appeared to be of
the view that the imposition of a single publication rule of the sort de35
sired by Dow Jones should only be done through legislation.
II.

AMERICAN CASE LAW

Three days after the High Court decided Dow Jones, a federal appellate court in the United States issued an opinion that reached a totally
different result in a case whose facts were quite similar, although it did
not involve international Internet communication, but rather communication between different states. 36 This case, Young v. New Haven Advocate, was initiated by the warden of a Virginia prison against two
Connecticut newspapers which had written articles that discussed the
treatment of prisoners which Connecticut had shipped to Virginia correc37
tional facilities as a result of overcrowding at Connecticut's prisons.
Most of the prisoners that Connecticut sent to Virginia were black or
Hispanic, and the newspapers published articles that implied that the
plaintiff was a racist and that alleged harsh treatment of prisoners in
Virginia. 38 These articles were posted on the newspapers' Web sites,
which were accessible to Virginia residents and which, the plaintiff alleged, defamed his reputation in Virginia. 3 9 The warden commenced
suit in a federal court in Virginia, and the defendants moved to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. 40 The district court denied the motion
and the defendants were granted leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal. 4 1 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the de42
fendants were not subject to suit in Virginia and reversed.
led President George W. Bush during his address to parliament in the fall of 2003 for undertaking unilateral military action in Iraq.
34. Id. at 125 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
35. As Justice Kirby noted, the Australian Law Reform Commission, which in 1979
made recommendations designed to harmonize the laws of defamation in Australia's various jurisdictions, suggested that the single publication rule be adopted. None of its recommendations has been enacted, however. [20021 HCA 56 at 128 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
36. See generally Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied (May 19, 2003).
37. Id. at 259.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Young, 315 F.3d at 260-61.
42. Id. at 264
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In reaching its conclusion the appellate court focused on the actions
and intent of the defendants. The court applied the long-established InternationalShoe jurisdictional standard under which an out-of-state defendant is deemed amenable to jurisdiction in a particular forum state
only where the "defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in
the forum state."4 3 Young considered three factors as relevant to this
inquiry: 1) whether the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
privileges of conducting activities in Virginia, 2) whether the plaintiffs
claim arises out of the defendant's Virginia-related activities, and 3)
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be
constitutionally reasonable. 4 4 The court stated that:
a person's act of placing information on the Internet is not sufficient by
itself to subject that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in
which the information is accessed, otherwise, a person placing information on the Internet would be subject to personal jurisdiction in every
juState, and the traditional due process principles governing a State's
45
risdiction over persons outside of its borders would be subverted.
The fact that the defendants' Web site was accessible in Virginia would
provide a basis for jurisdiction in Virginia only if they, in the court's
46
words, "manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers."
This, the court ruled, they did not do. Instead, the court concluded that
these newspapers maintain their websites to serve local readers in Connecticut, to expand the reach of their papers within their local markets,
and to provide their local markets with a place for classified ads....
The focus of the articles... was the Connecticut prisoner transfer policy
and its impact on the transferred prisoners and their families back
home in Connecticut. The articles reported on and encouraged a public
debate in Connecticut about whether the transfer policy was sound or
practical for that state and its4 7citizens. Connecticut, not Virginia, was
the focal point of the articles.
The court's opinion was consistent with a decision which had recently been issued by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In Griffis v.
Luban,48 the court held that a Minnesota woman could not properly be
sued in Alabama for posting comments on a Web site which allegedly
damaged the reputation of an Alabama plaintiff.4 9 The plaintiff in that
43. Intl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
44. Young, 315 F.3d at 261 (applying ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293
F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied (Jan. 13, 2003)).
45. Id. at 263 (quoting ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712).
46. Id. at 263.
47. Id.
48. 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 155 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2003).
49. Id. at 536-37.
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case was an instructor of Egyptology at the University of Alabama. Both
the plaintiff and the defendant participated in an Online bulletin board
about archaeology. The defendant posted messages on the Web site that
challenged the plaintiffs Egyptology credentials, and the plaintiff sued
her in an Alabama court. The defendant did not respond to the complaint and a default judgment was taken. The plaintiff thereafter sought
to have the default judgment enforced by a court in Minnesota, and the
defendant then moved to vacate the judgment on the grounds that the
Alabama court had lacked jurisdiction over her. The trial judge ruled
that jurisdiction in Alabama had been proper, and this ruling was affirmed by the Minnesota court of appeals, the intermediate court in Minnesota's three-level court system.
The defendant appealed this ruling further to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which reversed the earlier rulings. The supreme court
stated that the critical question in the case was "whether the defendant
expressly aimed the allegedly tortious conduct at the forum such that the
forum was the focal point of the tortious activity."50 The plaintiff argued
that this question could be answered in the affirmative, as the defendant
knew that the plaintiff lived in Alabama and that the messages could be
read there. She alleged in addition that the defendant's statements had
had "deleterious effects" on her professional reputation in Alabama, as
well as a consulting business she engaged in. The court disagreed, concluding that "the evidence does not demonstrate that [the defendant's]
statements were 'expressly aimed' at the state of Alabama." 5 1 The court
explained that
even if we assume [the defendant's] statements were widely read by followers of the [archaeology] newsgroup, the readers most likely would be
spread all around the country - maybe even around the world - and not
necessarily in the Alabama forum. The fact that messages posted to the
newsgroup could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have
been read anywhere in the world, cannot suffice
to establish Alabama
52
as the focal point of the defendant's conduct.
The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought review of this decision from the U.S.
53
Supreme Court.
Young and Griffis followed some recent American cases which had
held, outside of the defamation context, that the mere accessibility of a
Web site within a particular geographic location did not provide a basis

50.
51.
52.
anyone
53.

Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 536 (emphasis original). In addition, there was no evidence in this case that
in Alabama besides the plaintiff had actually read the messages at issue.
See generally Griffis v. Luban, 155 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2003).
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for jurisdiction in that location. 5 4 These cases, which concerned such issues as trademark infringement and antitrust claims, did not involve the
same dynamics of communication that underlie a defamation action,
where a defendant intentionally makes a statement concerning the
plaintiff and communicates that statement to a place where the plaintiffs reputation suffers. These cases should therefore only provide weak
authority for the proposition that jurisdiction in a defamation case can
not lie in the place where defamatory communication is received and
where the plaintiffs reputation is maligned. Moreover, Young and Griffis seemed to mark a departure from the approach established by the
U.S. Supreme Court for multi-jurisdictional claims of defamation involving printed periodicals. In 1984, the Supreme Court held in Calder v.
Jones that a California actress could sue the tabloid National Enquirer,
which is published in Florida and sold throughout the United States, for
libel in a California court. 5 5 The Court considered whether the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with California so as to reasonably
subject them to jurisdiction in that state, and concluded that jurisdiction
was proper in light of defendants' "intentional, and allegedly tortious actions [that] were expressly aimed at California."56 The Court explained:
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer
whose television career was centered in California. The article was
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms
both of [plaintiffs] emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal
point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the "effects" of their
57
Florida conduct in California.
54. See generally ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants,Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003) (copyright infringement); GTE New Media
Servs., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (antitrust case); Soma Med.
Intl. v. Standard CharteredBank, 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) (breach of contract and
negligence claims); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (copyright and
patent infringement claims); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997)
(trademark infringement and unfair competition claims); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,
130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (trademark infringement). But see Panavision Intl., LP v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (jurisdiction proper in case dealing with "cyber
squatting"); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (jurisdiction proper
in light of contractual connection with forum); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding jurisdiction in trademark case and adopting a "sliding
scale" approach to determining the existence of jurisdiction based on Internet contacts).
55. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
56. Id. at 789.
57. Id. at 788-89. The defendants had argued against jurisdiction in California, contending that subjecting newspapers to defamation actions in distant states would potentially chill their free speech rights. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the free
speech rights of defendants were already protected by the substantive law of defamation in
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In the Dow Jones case, the Supreme Court of Victoria believed that Calder supported the assertion of Internet-based jurisdiction in Victoria.
The American courts that recently decided Young and Griffis read Calder rather narrowly, however, and refused to see it as precedent for holding out-of-state defamers whose comments enter a state through
cyberspace accountable in that state. The Young court rather summarily
stated that it would not read Calder broadly and expressed concern that
publishers might be called to answer for their comments in every state
simply by posting them on the Web. The Minnesota supreme court made
more of an effort to distinguish Calder and suggested that that case was
driven by the special relationship between the State of California and
the entertainment industry, and that there was not a similar relation58
ship between the State of Alabama and the field of Egyptology.
Curiously, neither Young nor Griffis discussed another U.S. Supreme Court case which had been decided the same day as Calder and
indicated that, in the context of paper publications, the sale of a relatively small number of magazines in a state could subject the publisher
to jurisdiction there, even if the plaintiff had no connection whatsoever
to that state. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 59 the editor of Penthouse magazine claimed that she had been defamed by Hustler, a magazine that has often been the subject of major free speech cases in the
United States, 60 but by the time she decided to sue, the statute of limitations, which in defamation actions is very short in many American states
(often one year), had expired in every state except New Hampshire.
Neither Hustler nor the plaintiff was based in New Hampshire. The
plaintiff lived in New York; Hustler was incorporated in Ohio and had its
principal offices in California. Nonetheless, the plaintiff commenced a
federal suit in New Hampshire, basing jurisdiction on the fact that Hustler sold magazines in the state, as it did throughout the country. Sales
in New Hampshire amounted to less than one per cent of Hustler's total
circulation, however. 6 1 The district court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, and the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, ruling that "the
62
New Hampshire tail is too small to wag so large an out-of-state dog."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the action could proceed in
New Hampshire, as the sale of magazines in that state (on the order of
the United States, and that to consider this concern at the jurisdictional stage would be 'a
form of double counting." Id. at 790.
58. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 536. Calder also appears to have been driven by the fact
that more copies of the Enquirerwere sold in California than in any other state. Calder,
465 U.S. at 785.
59. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
60. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
61. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 34 (1st Cir. 1982).
62. Id. at 36.
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10-15,000 copies per month), provided a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
there. The Court acknowledged that the bulk of the harm done to the
plaintiff occurred outside New Hampshire, but stated that "Ithe victim
of a libel, like the victim of any other tort, may choose to bring suit in any
forum with which the defendant has 'certain minimum contacts.' ' 63 The
Court found it reasonable to hold Hustler accountable in New Hampshire, as it chose to enter the New Hampshire market and could therefore be charged with knowledge of its laws. 64 Interestingly, the Court
indicated that since New Hampshire had a single publication rule, it was
appropriate, and Hustler could have expected, to litigate all of the plaintiffs defamation claims in a state where only a small portion of all the
offending copies had been distributed. 65 This contrasts with the position
taken by Dow Jones, which was of the view that the single publication
rule required that its case be litigated in a state where it had a presence
and not in a state where only a small percentage of the subscribers to its
Web site resided.
While neither Young nor Griffis said so explicitly, these courts
seemed to be of the view that the Internet itself was such a unique medium of communication that the print-based analysis of Calder could not
properly be extended. This view is of course in contrast with the High
Court in Canberra, which expressly rejected Dow Jones' argument that
Australia's established common law should be reconfigured in light of
the novelty of the Internet's features.
III.

CONCLUSION

In the end, the American and Australian approaches to the analysis
of defamatory language appear to be irreconcilable, as each is the product of a different societal judgment regarding the relative worth of free
speech compared to a person's reputational interest. The international
community is undertaking efforts to address this clash of legal norms by
treaty, and a Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters has been prepared by the Hague Conference on Private International law, under which a plaintiff would be
able to recover damages for defamatory publication on the Internet by
suing either in the state in which the plaintiff is habitually resident or in
the state where the defendant is habitually resident. 6 6 The treaty process is a slow one, however, and we can accordingly expect many more
cases to arise in which people complain about speech on the Internet
which violates the cultural norms of the country where the information
63.
64.
65.
66.

Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 777.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Victoria in Dow Jones. [2001] VSC 305 at

74.
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is received but which is protected under the law of the country where it
originates. 67 Such disputes can arise not only in defamation cases, but
can extend to all laws which seek to govern communication in some manner. The nations of the world have starkly different laws regarding such
issues as the right to engage in open political discourse, to criticize the
government, to promote notions of racial superiority, to blaspheme religion, to advertise certain products, and to produce or consume sexually
explicit speech. 68 For those of us who are intrigued by the Internet, with
its endless possibilities for communication, finding information, planning vacations, checking movie listings, and generally wasting time, it
will be interesting to watch as technology and the law continues to evolve
and influence each other's development.
67. The U.S. and Australia are not the only countries where courts have been called on
to decide whether they have jurisdiction over Internet-based defamation claims. A Canadian court ruled that it had jurisdiction over a defamation action arising from an article
which had been published in Uganda, posted on the Internet, and then downloaded in Ontario. Kitakufe v. Oloya, Ontario Ct. of Justice. The High Court of Malaysia concluded that
a defamatory article which had been posted on the Internet by news media in Singapore
had not been published in Malaysia in a case where there was no evidence that the offending articles had been accessed by anyone in that country. Lee Teck Chee & Anor v. Merrill
Lynch Intl. Bank Ltd., [1998] C.L.J. 188. In addition, in Godfrey v. Demon Internet, Ltd.,
[1999] 4 All E.R. 343, an English judge remarked that publication on the usenet (the Internet's close cousin) occurred whenever someone accesses a posting and "sees" it. The
Supreme Court of Victoria made reference to all three of these cases. [2001] VSC 305 at
44-56.
68. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that once a provider posts sexually explicit
content on the Internet it cannot prevent that content from entering any community in the
world. Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (declaring Internet censorship
statute unconstitutional). See also the Court's recent opinion upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute designed to limit access to sexually-themed speech at public libraries. U.S. v. Am. Lib. Assn., 539 U.S. 194 (Jun. 23, 2003). American and French courts have
dueled over Yahoo's right to facilitate the sale of Nazi memorabilia on the Internet. Compare Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168
(N.D. Cal. 2001) with Order of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris of 22 May 2000.
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